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FIELDWORK AND THE POLITICAL 
 
By Sameer M. Ashar* 
 
 
It is not in our power to eliminate conflicts and escape our human condition, but 
it is in our power to create the practices, discourses and institutions that would 
allow those conflicts to take an agonistic form.  This is why the defence and the 
radicalization of the democratic project require acknowledging the political in 
its antagonistic dimension and abandoning the dream of a reconciled world that 
would have overcome power, sovereignty and hegemony. 
 
-- Chantal Mouffe1  
 
are the cops in our heads and hearts? 
 
        -- Paula X. Rojas2  
 
 
The choice of fieldwork is central to the clinical enterprise and intensely political.  
As Chantal Mouffe argues, “political questions are not mere technical issues to be solved 
by experts. Properly political questions always involve decisions which require us to make 
a choice between conflicting alternatives.”3  The clinician, much like a program officer at 
a foundation or an agent of the government, makes decisions about how to distribute scarce 
resources to people with limited access to those resources.  Describing one’s intake criteria 
as “apolitical,”4 providing “direct service,”5 exclusively focused on “small cases,”6 or 
triaged strictly by income or wealth are political choices that generate opportunity costs.  
Though all of these criteria reflect political choices made by clinicians, they are often 
described in such a way as to elide larger social conflicts, above and beyond the specific 
contexts of the individual case.7  This type of description, perhaps buttressed by “objective” 
factors such as the income of a prospective client, can protect clinics from hostile 
institutional forces and attract students with a broad range of ideological commitments.  
However, it also obscures the core social conflicts underlying the life conditions of 
disadvantaged clients.  Clinicians who seek to avoid these core social conflicts 
preemptively limit the scope of their representation and their interventions, thus 
confirming—to both law students and society at-large—the view of law as status quo 
reinforcing. 
 
In any case, it is essential for new clinical teachers to understand the rules, 
constraints, and expectations imposed by law schools and the legal profession, or the 
“politics” of clinical legal education.  The preceding chapter well documents the issues 
meriting consideration in fieldwork selection.  Indeed, this book as a whole implicitly 
captures and documents the “politics” of the current era of clinical legal education.  It 
remains essential for established teachers to remain conscious of the limits imposed upon 
us by external forces, as well as by our own internal will-to-action, constrained as it is by 
path dependence, institutional context, and our psychological features.  As time passes, 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370053
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2370053 
there may be a tendency to accept the politics of our field of practice and to refrain from 
interrogating those rules, constraints, and expectations.  The challenge then lies in figuring 
out how to keep “the political”—alternative conceptions of society as articulated by those 
excluded from the established social structure—at the surface in clinical legal education.8 
 
 In this essay, I briefly describe two types of fieldwork that explicitly facilitate the 
engagement of clinical faculty, students, and law schools with the political: (1) lawyering 
in collaboration with social movements; and (2) lawyering on behalf of prisoners and 
detainees in the United States.  The learning goals and opportunities, design principles, and 
environmental factors delineated in the main chapter create the space in which we work.  
How do we choose to fill that space?  Do those rules, constraints, and expectations give 
any indication of flexibility or plasticity?  As Bryant and Johnson explain, there is no 
specific kind of fieldwork necessitated by the commonly accepted learning goals and 
opportunities, design principles, and environmental factors in clinical legal education.  The 
practice areas that I discuss below suggest that there is a modest degree of autonomy in 
clinical fieldwork selection.  This autonomy – which we may underestimate or diminish – 
facilitates the engagement of clinical faculty, law students, and law schools with the 
political.   
 
COLLABORATING WITH VISIONARY MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 The search for appropriate cases and projects stemming from social movement 
activity is a difficult one.  Movements do not advance on an academic calendar.  Case and 
project development is often challenging: movement organizations with strong, centralized 
leadership raise questions about their democratic nature.  Organizations with flatter, 
multipolar leadership structures may not be able to prioritize formulation of a legal project 
for a clinic.  Movement campaigns sometimes gain momentum and at other times limp 
along or end completely.  Partners pursuing multiple organizing strategies may decide, with 
their member-clients, to pull the plug on a case into which clinic students have poured their 
hearts.  Organizers may shift their focus or member-clients may be demoralized by a 
campaign without tangible benefits.  Campaign targets may be badly chosen, without deep 
pockets for the purposes of damages actions or with a deep well of resources including 
lawyers willing to wage a war of attrition with an overmatched clinic team. 
 
 Each of these challenges could be described as inherent to the representation by a 
clinic of any organization—activist or establishmentarian, non-profit or corporate, small or 
large.  These challenges may also, with little effort, be transmuted to describe work with 
individual clients who are “difficult,” unpredictable, or resource-deprived.9  The root of 
these challenges—working with an ambitious, mission-focused organizational partner 
operating without adequate resources in a rapidly changing environment—requires 
tolerance for uncertainty and commitments to flexibility and experimentalism.  
Interestingly, these are some of the same primary features identified by legal education 
reform advocates based on their analysis of a profession in the midst of structural 
transformation.10 
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 In a prior article, I outlined the many pedagogical opportunities created by 
collaborations with movement organizations11 Central among those is the opportunity to 
work with clients with explicitly articulated visions of society.  While every representation 
is political, a movement organization’s critical vision brings to the fore important lessons 
for law students: about conflicts between professional norms and the political commitments 
of clients; the incongruence of law, legal institutions, and justice in a given case; and 
reflections on lawyer role, which have the potential to spur greater career intentionality 
amongst students.  Engagement with the political through law school clinics speaks to the 
public values of the profession.12  Ann Shalleck has discussed this as the responsibility of 
all law schools to train facilitators of democratic process and democratic governance.13  
Jane Aiken formulates a related idea in arguing for the education of “provocateurs for 
justice.”14  This thread of thinking within legal education and the profession is under stress 
as market pressures bear down on law schools.  It is a resilient and noble ideal that requires 
an active defense.  Clinics are positioned to advance this ideal within legal education 
through intentional fieldwork selection and collaborations with social movement actors.  
 
 Work with true movement organizations embraces the political by bringing outsider 
narratives to bear on the law.  In the current context, this work is often premised on the 
fulfillment of the promise of prior legal enactments or by filling gaps in the latticework of 
civil rights law.  Movements have also, by necessity, mobilized against the use by state and 
private actors of law to impede political organizing and solidarity.  This oppositional stance 
is sometimes mirrored in the defense of individual criminal defendants, prisoners, and 
detainees.  While the movement actors have been made marginal through legal and social 
norms, criminal defendants, prisoners, and detainees are literally banished from and 
isolated outside of home communities.  For some defenders, the representation of an 
indigent person in this position is a political choice.  In the next section of this essay, I set 
out the political underpinnings of individual representation in three different contexts of 
state authority.  
 
LAWYERING IN “STATES OF EXCEPTION” 
 
Thus Guantanamo fills an existential need for security.  That we obtain such 
security through the quarantine of darkened bodies is a familiar compromise—at 
Guantanamo, as well as in the territorial United States—and one that is not easily 
disturbed. . . .  Closer to home, the overincarceration of African Americans and 
Latinos in U.S. prisons promises safety through racial containment.15  
 
The “man” who remains after ties to society have been nullified is nothing but a 
body, an extralegal being, an alien.  Interviewees, who in many cases thought of 
themselves as quasi-citizens, discovered that, through detention, they became this 
alien.16 
 
Physical isolation and compromised legal process are key features cutting across 
three contemporaneous regimes of state authority: “enemy combatants” held at 
Guantanamo, criminal defendants jailed prior to conviction and imprisoned thereafter, and 
migrants detained on the basis of civil violations of law.  When the state engages in racial 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370053
(and class) containment by physically confining the disadvantaged, it is incumbent upon 
lawyers to fight for democratic values through individual representation.  It is incumbent 
upon lawyers to pierce the isolation regime imposed by the state and abetted in some cases 
by private, for-profit penal companies.  When clinics participate in these cases, they engage 
faculty, students, and law schools in the political.  Judith Resnik connects sets of detainees 
targeted by the state over time in the service of a succession of wars waged on the enemies 
within: revolutionary ideology, drugs, gangs, terror, darkened bodies, the foreign-born.17  
These wars are the result of a flickering national resolve fanned aflame by political actors.  
They use instances of collective vulnerability to impose punitive executive power on 
groups they choose to personify the scourge within.  
 
Mark Tushnet argues that “states of exception” are emergency periods that expose 
the role of politics in determining the course and content of law.18  Muneer Ahmad, looking 
as a detainee lawyer at the place and the processes that comprise Guantanamo, states that 
“[a]t some point, systematic illegality—particularly when enacted under a claim of law—
crosses into lawlessness.”19  Giorgio Agamben, who revived the “state of exception” 
concept in the post-9/11 period, contends that the sovereign may attempt to naturalize the 
rules and power relations established during an emergency period.20  Alexandra Natapoff 
implies the same in discussing over-criminalization in the United States:  
 
In communities where fifty percent or more of the men are under criminal justice 
supervision at any given time, where the odds that a black man will be arrested in 
his lifetime are one in three, and where thirteen percent of the men are 
disenfranchised, the criminal system is the government.  The central fact about this 
government, of course, is that it is coercive and punitive.  However, its failings are 
exacerbated by the fact that it actively silences its constituents, cutting off 
traditional avenues for democratic change and practically ensuring official 
unresponsiveness.21 
 
Lawfully imposed regimes of unconstrained executive authority wielded over groups of 
people in times of emergency become “the government” in those communities and for 
those groups.  Representation of individuals subject to those regimes requires engagement 
with the political.  The larger socio-political phenomena that created the individual case 
are fundamental to the lawyer’s understanding of the facts and the written and unwritten 
rules governing the proceeding. 
 
 The physical isolation of Guantanamo is obvious, accentuated by the efforts of 
successive administrations to prevent federal courts from establishing jurisdictional 
authority over the military base and detention center.22  Prisons have been sited in states 
far from the metropolitan areas in which policing and arrests are most prevalent.  Even 
jails, such as Rikers Island in New York, though close to the home communities of inmates, 
are made inaccessible by correctional authorities.  Lawyers from Manhattan have to take 
the subway to a bus to a parking lot in Queens, where they are transported to the island on 
corrections department buses.  This intermodal route can take a half-day for a lawyer to 
meet a single client at the jail.  Unsurprisingly, a New York Times report from 2001 
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indicated that only 36 percent of lawyers go to Rikers to meet their clients and indigent 
defense expert Steven Zeidman thinks that this number shrinks as each year passes.23 
 
 Immigrants, who do not have a right to counsel for their deportation cases, were for 
many years transported long distances from their home communities to jurisdictions such 
as the Eastern District of Louisiana and the border cities of Texas.  These transfers had the 
effect of distancing migrants from their friends, family, non-profit advocates, and potential 
legal representation and putting their cases in districts and circuits friendlier to the 
government’s imperative to speed deportation.24  Additionally, by placing migrants from 
Mexico and Central America in liminal spaces away from their communities in the United 
States and closer to their countries of origin, the government sought to make deportation 
feel inevitable rather than subject to legal checks and judicial discretion.25  The Department 
of Homeland Security has recently shifted its policy on detainee transfers in response to 
advocacy efforts by activists and lawyers.26  However, even when migrants are detained in 
the same metropolitan areas in which they were resident, they are placed in private and 
county facilities hours from central business districts where courts and lawyers are 
concentrated.  Detainees are “present” at their court hearings by teleconference or lawyers 
are beamed into immigration courts in detention centers to represent their clients by 
teleconference, with attendant erosion of due process and effective assistance of counsel. 
 
 In its rawest form, the state employs the governance strategy of physical isolation 
by holding prisoners in “Supermax” facilities in solitary confinement 23 hours per day, 
seven days per week over many years.27  Even in regular state and federal facilities, 
prisoners are managed and discouraged from contact with outsiders through physical 
battery and assault.  Mika’il DeVeaux, a scholar and teacher formerly imprisoned in five 
different facilities in New York State, described the management strategy as follows: 
 
I was assaulted so that I could be made into an inmate. Every encounter with people 
from the outside world, whether visitors or other guests, was followed by acts of 
humiliation, which included being stripped naked and made to expose every body 
cavity, running my fingers through my hair, and showing the bottoms of my feet.28   
 
This kind of physical abuse and the widening use of solitary confinement are commonly 
understood to foster mental illness amongst prisoners.29  Less well understood is the impact 
of housing large numbers of already mentally ill people in prisons and jails.  According to 
Paul Sarlo, “more Americans now receive treatment for mental illness in jails and prisons 
than hospitals or other facilities” and Rikers Island in New York is “the largest psychiatric 
facility in the nation” with approximately 3000 mentally ill inmates.30  Moral outrage and 
litigation against inhumane conditions of confinement led to deinstitutionalization of the 
mentally ill; that kind of outrage and associated legal action is now blunted by the regimes 
of control that criminalize a particularly vulnerable segment of the population. 
 
 These conditions of physical confinement at jails, prisons, and detention centers 
compromise the legal process extended by the state to prisoners and detainees.  By 
necessity, migrants litigate pro se and sign agreements stipulating to their own deportation 
rather than fighting to remain with loved ones in the United States.31  Legal representation 
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by teleconference is substandard and arguably a violation of constitutional due process.  
The Potemkin proceedings of military commission hearings at Guantanamo have been 
widely documented.  As Muneer Ahmad argues, the totalizing narratives deployed by the 
state to justify harsh and isolating conditions of confinement erase individual histories and 
remove space for judges and agency personnel to exercise the discretion that might ease 
such conditions and potentially result in release.32 
 
 Like the social movement cases, representation of prisoners and detainees presents 
a host of logistical and pedagogical challenges for law school clinics.  However, teachers 
have structured excellent offerings in these contexts from the rise of modern clinical legal 
education to the present.  Colleagues who have been doing work in these contexts constitute 
the pedagogical resource needed to grow the field. 33   The logistical challenges to 
formulation of client narratives, confrontations with deeply unjust systems and lawfully 
lawless spaces, and opportunities to relieve prisoners and detainees from the conditions of 
“bare life”—the methodical stripping of a person toward their becoming “just a body”34—
are essential lessons for law students.  The values implicated in these cases speak to the 
foundational values of the profession.35  This thread of clinical work should be elevated 
rather than submerged during a period of retrenchment in legal education.  It should 
constitute an institutional imperative within clinical education—featured at the conferences 
and in scholarship—and amongst the many clinical programs in the midst of expansion or 




To be sure, the actual work undertaken in any area of poverty or civil rights law 
may lead to the co-articulation with clients of social visions otherwise excluded from 
politics.  It is also true that organizational and individual defense clinics may carry out their 
charge in ways that undermine the political.  However, as I have argued elsewhere,36 
because of the constrained nature of clinical practice—hemmed in by institutional 
requirements, the consumerist demands of students, and professional ethical rules that 
elevate individualistic client interests—context matters.  Some areas of work and some 
types of engagements are more likely to enable faculty, students, and law schools to engage 
with the political.  Both for new and established clinicians, consciousness and intentionality 
as to the kinds of practice that may lead to political engagement is essential.  It is no less 
than a determination of the kind of moral/ethical, pedagogical universe in which we choose 
to place our selves and our students.  There are too many incentives stacked in favor of 
marginalization and isolation and against solidarity and community.  There are too many 
incentives stacked in favor of leaving social, economic, and political arrangements as they 
are.   
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